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IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

HENRY LOUIS JACKSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080418-CA

:

INTRODUCTION
First, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay evidence that
prejudiced Jackson. See Aplt. Br. at 20-31. This Court should reach this argument as it
pertains to Detective Winters because Jackson's argument is adequately briefed and
properly preserved. See infra at Parts I, II. Further, this Court should hold the admission
of Detective Winters's recitation of Kathy's prior consistent statements violated rule 801
of the Utah Rules of Evidence because Kathy's alleged motive to fabricate predated her
statements to Detective Winters. See infra at Part III. Finally, this Court should reverse
because the trial court's erroneous admission of Officer Ware's and Detective Winters's
recitations of their interviews with Kathy was prejudicial. Sex infra at Part IV.
Second, the State's peremptory challenge violated equal protection. See Aplt. Br. at
31-35. This Court should address the merits of this argument because Jackson's Bats on
objection was timely. See infra at Part V.

Third, the trial court erred when it allowed the State to reopen its case and present
additional evidence regarding the aggravating circumstance. See Aplt. Br. at 39-46. This
Court should reverse for this error because the State was required to prove identity during
its case-in-chief and its strategic decision not to gather or admit sufficient evidence to
prove identity was not an appropriate reason to reopen the case. See infra at Part VI.
Fourth, Jackson argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
dismiss for destruction of evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 46-48. He asks this Court to reverse
for that error because he requested that the State produce the vehicle in his request for
discovery filed shortly after his arrest and because the destruction of the vehicle prejudiced
his case. See infra at Part VII.
Jackson does not respond to the State's other arguments because those arguments
are adequately addressed in the opening brief. See Aplt. Br. at 20-50.
ARGUMENT
L

JACKSON ADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING
DETECTIVE WINTERS TO TESTIFY ABOUT KATHY'S PRIOR
CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

Jackson adequately briefed his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting "Kathy's statements to Detective Winters as prior consistent statements." Aplt.
Br. at 26 (emphasis omitted).
Utah's appellate courts are "not cua depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research.""' State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, *pi 5 973 P.2d
404 (citations omitted). "In deciding whether an argument has been adequately briefed,"
2

this Court will "look to the standard set forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Rule 24(a)(9)
says: "The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority."
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; see Jaeger, 1999 UT 1 at p i (same).
The State complains that Jackson's briefing is inadequate because he "does not ever
specify which statement(s) he finds objectionable." Aple. Br. at 24. Contrary to the
State's claim, Jackson does not "suggest that all of Detective Winters' testimony was
inadmissible." Aple. Br. at 24. Rather, he argues that Detective Winters's recitation of
Kathy's prior consistent statements was inadmissible. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. In particular, as
explained in the opening brief, Jackson argues that "Detective Winters' recitation of
Kathy's prior statement was not admissible because Kathy's statements were not 'made
prior to the time a motive to fabricate arose.'" Aplt. Br. at 27 (quoting State v. Bujan,
2008 UT 47, Ifl, 190 P.3d 1255). "Further, even if Detective Winters' recitation of
Kathy's statement was appropriate under rule 801(d)(1)(B), the trial court still erred by
admitting Detective Winters' recollection of the interview in its 'entirety.'" Aplt. Br. at 28
(quoting Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at 1J10) (citing R. 215:178-90). "Instead, the trial court should
have required the State to elicit only those statements that rebutted the charge of recent
fabrication." Aplt. Br. at 28.

3

Jackson's argument mirrors the argument raised by the defendant and accepted by
our supreme court in Bui an. In Bujan, as here, the trial court overruled the defendant's
repeated objections and allowed the detective to testify about the alleged victim's '"prior
consistent statements/" Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at ^ 3 - 5 . As in this case, the defendant in
Bujan did not challenge the prior consistent statements individually on appeal. Id at ^[6.
Rather, he argued that "it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to admit [thej
Detective['s] [] hearsay testimony pursuant to rule 801(d)(1)(B)" because the alleged
victim's "statements to [the] Detective [] were," as a whole, "made after a motive . . . to
fabricate the rape arose." Id.
Agreeing with the defendant, our supreme court did not split the prior statement into
pieces or analyze each sentence individually. Id, at ffl|8-10. Instead, it addressed the prior
consistent statement as a whole and determined that the alleged victim's "consistent
statements" were inadmissible "under rule 801(d)(1)(B)" because they "were not made
prior to the time the alleged motive to fabricate arose." Id. at l(|8. Further, "[ejven if the
testimony had been offered for rehabilitative purposes," rather than for substantive
purposes under rule 801(d)(1)(B), "it was still inappropriate to admit the entirety of the
testimony." Id, at •jjlO (citation omitted). The "rule of completeness" allows statements to
be admitted if they '"are "relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context
the portion fof testimony] already introduced.'"" Id. (citation omitted). "[Tjhe admission
of [the] DetectivefsJ [] recounting of her entire conversation with [the alleged victim],"
therefore, "would likewise be inadmissible under the rule of completeness because it went
beyond the information necessary to rebut the charges of recent fabrication." Id

4

Jackson asks this Court to follow our supreme court's analysis in Bujan, The trial
court allowed Detective Winters to recount "everything she could remember of what
[Kathy] told her." Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at «[[10; see Aplt. Br. at 27-28. In particular, the trial
court allowed Detective Winters to testify that Kathy said:
•

Jackson "had been stalking her for months because he wanted a
relationship with her." R. 215:182.

•

Jackson "had said she would be his until her last dying breath." R.
215:183.

•

On November 8? Jackson had "[pjushed" her, "hit her in the face[,] and
threatened to kill her." R. 215:183.

•

On November 9, she and Hardman "had gone and got some lunch." R.
215:184. When they returned and "she got out of the car,. . . she saw
Henry and his car in the parking lot." R. 215:184. She was on the
"grassy area on the curb" when "Henry accelerated his car and hit her."
R. 215:184. Then "he backed up," "ran over her ankle," and "turned" the
car so it faced her again. R. 215:184-85. Then Hardman "went over to
the car, opened the doorf,] and punched Henry." R. 215:185. Then
Jackson "got out of the vehicle and began chasing [Hardman] through the
parking lot" with "a butcher knife." R. 215:186. Jackson then returned
to her and "said, You're coming with me, bitch. I'm going to kill you."
R.215:186.

See Aplt. Br. at 16-17,
These statements, as a whole, were inadmissible because they "were not made prior
to the time the alleged motive to fabricate arose, as is required for admission under rule
801(d)(1)(B)." Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at ^8; see Aplt. Br. at 27; infra at Part III. Further,
even if Detective Winters's recitation of Kathy's statements was appropriate under rule
801(d)(1)(B), the trial court still erred by admitting Detective Winters's recollection of the
interview in its "entirety." Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at TJ10; R- 215:178-90; see Aplt. Br. at 28.

5

Instead, the trial court should have required the State to elicit only those statements that
rebutted the charge of recent fabrication. Bui an, 2008 UT 47 at ^f 10; see Aplt. Br. at 28.
IL

JACKSON'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY ALLOWING DETECTIVE WINTERS TO
RECOUNT KATHY'S PRIOR STATEMENTS IS PRESERVED

"In criminal cases, '"specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of
the trial court record'" before the issue can be heard on appeal." State v. Worwood, 2007
UT 47, TJ16, 164 P.3d 397. The preservation rule exists because: (1) "the trial court ought
to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and
(2) "a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of
enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, . . .
claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^|11, 10
P.3d 346 (alterations in original) (quotations and citations omitted).
An issue is properly preserved if it is "'raised to a level of consciousness such that
the trial judge can consider it.5" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(citation omitted); see Worwood, 2007 UT 47 at 1fi|16, 19 (holding issue "must be '"raised
to a level of consciousness" that allows the trial court an adequate opportunity to address
it" (citations omitted)); State v. Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, ^9, 164 P.3d 1264 (holding
issue is preserved if it is "'"presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has
an opportunity to rule on that issue5"" (citations omitted)); Holmstrom v. C.R. England,
Inc., 2000 UT App 239,1f26, 8 P.3d 281 (same); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945
P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same).

6

This is true even if the party raised the issue "indirectly" or with less detail than on
appeal. Brown, 856 P.2d at 361 (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, in Garcia, this
Court determined that the State's argument relying on the "Franks doctrine" was preserved
even though "the State did not formally cite the Franks case below," because it "argued the
underlying premise of the Franks doctrine" and this Court had "no doubt the trial court was
on notice of the State's legal argument." Garcia, 2007 UT App 228 at ^[10; see, e.g., State
v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322,1fi|21-22, 142 P.3d 581 (holding "counsel's objections, in
conjunction with the court's reliance on rule 801, were sufficient to preserve the issue for
appeal" because "both of the policies articulated in Holgate" were satisfied and "the trial
court clearly understood that counsel's objection pertained to rule 801 when it allowed
[detective] to testify with regard to [alleged victim's] out-of-court statements under that
rule"), affd, Bujan, 2008 UT 47; see State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, Tf25 n. 4, 37
P.3d 260 (addressing identity issue even though not specifically preserved because
defendant preserved probable cause issue and identity included in probable cause issue);
Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 1992) (stating that although
"[defendant's] objections were not textbook examples of specificity," they nonetheless
"adequately directed the trial judge's attention to the claimed error" such that "they were
sufficient").
In this case, Jackson preserved his argument that Detective Winters's recitation of
Kathy's prior consistent statements was inadmissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B). The State
claims that Jackson's objection was "strictly limited" to perjury and did not encompass his
underlying argument that Kathy lied to the police following the incident because she "was

7

trying to avoid being charged for her substantive conduct during the November 9
incident." Aplc. Br. at 26 & n.3. This argument fails because the State and the trial court
both understood that Jackson's charge of recent fabrication was not based on the narrow,
statutory definition of one particular type of perjury but on the fact that Kathy believed that
if she uchange[d] her story" at trial she would "facfc] additional criminal charges" and
could be sent back to prison. R. 215:90-91.
Jackson did not question Kathy about perjury because she changed her story at trial.
See Aple. Br. at 26. Nor did he argue that "Kathy was committing perjury because she
'showed up in court today and gave a different story than [she had] given in the past.'"
Aple. Br. at 26 (quoting R. 215:90). On the contrary, he acknowledged that Kathy's
statements had been basically consistent and asked Kathy what she thought would happen
"//[she] showed up at court today and gave a different story than [she had] given in the
past." R. 215:90. He then used her responses to argue that her statements—both to the
police and at trial—were false. R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67. She lied to the police originally
because she wanted to protect herself and Hardman from being charged with offenses
related to their roles in the incident. R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67. And she maintained the lies
at trial because she believed that if she changed her story she would wwfac[e] additional
criminal charges" and could be sent back to prison. R. 215:90-91; 216:23, 65-67.
In context, this is how Jackson's cross-examination of Kathy proceeded:
Defense Counsel: And Ms. Capellen, have you had any
conversations with anyone about what happens to you if you
show up in court today and change your story?
Kathy: No.

8

Defense Counsel: Okay. What do you imagine would happen
to you if you showed up in court today and gave a different
story than you've given in the past?
Kathy: They Prosecutor: Objection. Calls for speculation.
Trial Court: Sustained. You don't need to answer.
Defense Counsel: Are you familiar with the State's laws on
perjury?
Kathy: Yes, I am.
Defense Counsel: Do you understand perjury is a crime?
Kathy: Yes, I do.
Defense Counsel: So you understand if you came into court
today and changed your story from how you told it in the past,
you could be facing additional criminal charges?
Kathy: Yes, I do.
Defense Counsel: And you don't like being in prison, do you?
Kathy: No, I don't.
Defense Counsel: You don't want to spend any extra time there
if you can help it?
Kathy: No, I do not.
Defense Counsel: And you understand that iht prison is
controlled and governed by the State Prosecutor: Objection, your Honor. This - she doesn't have
any competency to testify to this.
Trial Court: Sustained. We're done with this line of
questioning, counsel. Go to your next Defense Counsel: Your Honor, if we could approach.
9

Trial Court: No, we don't need to approach.
Defense Counsel: Okay.
R. 215:90-91.
Although the trial court prevented Jackson from continuing the line of questioning,
Jackson's purpose in asking the questions is clear: He wanted to show that Kathy lied
during the police interviews and that she would tell the same lies at trial because she
believed that if she changed her story, she would face additional charges and could face
additional prison time. See R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67.
Jackson did not explain the purpose of his questions until closing argument. Cf.
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(g)(3)-(7) (explaining that argument comes after the presentation of
evidence); Utah R. Evid. 103(c) ("Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury
by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the
hearing of the jury."). The State and the trial court, however, understood the "implied"
purpose of the questions. R. 216:22-24. When the parties and the trial court later
recounted the sidebar conference in which Jackson objected to Detective Winters's
testimony and the trial court overruled the objection, both the State and the trial court
indicated that they understood the "suggestion and implication . . . of recent fabrication"
raised by Jackson's line of questioning. R. 216:22-24. Then, without indicating a need for
additional explanation, the trial court ruled that "prior statements by [KathyJ could come in
under 801" because a "proper influence or motive had been raised." R. 216:23-24.
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Thus, Jackson's argument is properly preserved because he gave the trial court "an
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and he did not
"forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing] [his] chances of acquittal."
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^11 (alterations in original) (quotations and citations omitted).
IIL

KATHY'S ALLEGED MOTIVATION TO FABRICATE PREDATED
HER STATEMENTS TO DETECTIVE WINTERS

As explained in Part II, Jackson's charge of recent fabrication was not based on the
narrow, statutory definition of one particular type of perjury. Sec supra at Part II. Part 5
of Utah Code title 76, chapter 8, is titled "Falsification of Official Matters." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-501 to -514 (2008). The term "perjury" is not used in or limited to any one
section in this Part; in particular, it is not used in or limited to section 76-8-502. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-502 ("A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if in any
official proceeding: . . . [h]e makes a false material statement under oath or affirmation or
swears or affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and he does not believe
the statement to be true."); but see Aple. Br. at 26. Rather, "perjury," at least as it is
colloquially understood and as it was used in this case to elicit information from a witness
who had no legal training, is a general term that may refer to any of the offenses listed in
Part 5. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3-310(l)(b) (2007) ("Any person violating this
subsection is guilty of perjury and may be prosecuted and punished as provided in Title 76,
Chapter 8, Part 5."); Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-104(3) (2008) ("Any willful false swearing as
to the purported material facts set out in this report constitutes the crime of perjury and
shall be punished as such under Title 76, Utah Criminal Code."); Utah Code Ann. § 59-5204(3) (2008) (same).
11

Nor was Jackson's charge of recent fabrication based on an argument that "Kathy
was committing perjury because she 'showed up in court today and gave a different story
than [she had] given in the past.'" Aple. Br. at 26 (quoting R. 215:90). Jackson did not
argue that Kathy changed her story at trial. See R. 214-16. To the contrary, he
acknowledged that Kathy's statements to the police and at trial were basically consistent.
In the part of the record quoted by the State, Jackson asked Kathy what she thought would
happen to her "z/[she] showed up at court today and gave a different story than [she had]
given in the pasl." R. 215:90. He then used her responses to argue that her statements to
the police and at trial—though consistent—were false. R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67.
In sum, Jackson's rule 801 argument was not tied to one particular definition of
perjury or one particular perjury statute. Rather, his argument was that Kathy lied to the
police because she wanted to protect herself and Hardman from being charged with
offenses related to their roles in the incident. R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67. And she
maintained the lies at trial because she believed that if she changed her story she would
"fac[c] additional criminal charges" and could be sent back to prison. R. 215:90-91;
216:23, 65-67. Thus, Kathy's statements to Detective Winters were not "made prior to the
time a motive to fabricate arose." Bui an, 2008 UT 47 at ^(1. Rather, the interview
"occurred after the alleged motive for [Kathy] to fabricate the [attempted murder]
allegations] arose." Id. at ^8. "Therefore, [Kathy's] consistent statements were not made
prior to the time the alleged motive to fabricate arose, as is required for admission under
rule 801(d)(1)(B)." IcL Additionally, the testimony was also "inadmissible under the rule
of completeness" because Detective Winters "was not asked to complete or rebut any

12

particular statements from [Kathy's] prior testimony." Id. at ^JIO. Instead, she "testified to
her entire conversation with [Kathy], recounting chronologically everything she could
remember of what [Kathy] told her." IdL Thus, her testimony "went beyond the
information necessary to rebut the charges of recent fabrication." Id.
IV,

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF OFFICER
WARE'S AND DETECTIVE WINTERS'S RECITATIONS OF THEIR
INTERVIEWS WITH KATHY WAS PREJUDICIAL

When assessing prejudice, this Court will not apply the sufficiency-of-the-evidence
standard; "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by the error." State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d
1116, 1121-22 (Utah 1989). In State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957), our supreme
court rejected the State's argument that "the defendant's guilt was so plainly manifest that
to receive [the police officer's inadmissible hearsay testimony] did not result in prejudice
in the cause." Sibcrt, 310 P.2d at 392.
In attempting to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, it must be assumed that all of the State's
evidence was presented for that purpose. The jury may well
have regarded the officer's evidence as more persuasive than
that of [the alleged victim]. From the record it appears that he
was more confident and self-assured, and was able to be more
definite as to the detail of the crime than the complaining
witness himself. It is a delicate task for a reviewing court to
attempt to appraise what weight particular evidence may have
had with the jury. It would be going a long way indeed for [the
Court] to entirely discount the possibility that [a police
officer's inadmissible hearsay testimony] had some effect upon
[the jury's] deliberations. It is the exclusive prerogative of the
jury to judge the weight of the evidence and the facts to be
found therefrom. It is of grave importance, particularly in
criminal trials, that such prerogative be left to them and that the
proceedings be conducted in such manner as to assure every
safeguard to the rights of defendants.
Id. at 392-93.
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Likewise, in Bujan, this Court held the admission of the detective's "hearsay
testimony was prejudicial and therefore requires reversal." Bujan, 2006 UT App 322 at
Y|30-33, affd, Bujan, 2008 UT 47. "There was no physical evidence of [the] sexual
assault, and no testimony directly supporting [the alleged victim's] account of the night in
question. Therefore, Detective['s] [] testimony provided the only corroboration of [the]
alleged rape." Bujan, 2006 UT App 322 at ^32. "As such," this Court could not say that
the detective's "testimony constituted harmless error." Id (citation omitted).
As explained in the opening brief, neither Officer Ware's nor Detective Winters's
testimony was "'merely cumulative to that already testified to by the victim.'" Aple. Br. at
22 (citations omitted); see Aplt. Br. at 28-31. As in Bujan, credibility played a crucial role
in this case. Kathy's and Hardman's testimony provided the only evidence to support their
version of the altercation from its inception until Jackson exited the vehicle. See Aplt. Br.
at 28. Thus, Officer Ware's and Detective Winters's "testimony provided the only
corroboration o f Kathy's and Hardman's claim that Jackson was the aggressor: He
purposely struck Kathy with his vehicle and he did not act against Hardman in selfdefense. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322 at f\}31-32; see Aplt. Br. at 28. Further, as in Sjbert,
both officers' testimony was "more confident and self-assured" than Kathy's and, in some
instances, was "more definite as to the detail of the crime than" Kathy's. Sibert, 310 P.2d
at 392; see Aplt. Br. at 28-31.
In sum, Kathy and Hardman each had reasons to lie to the police and to maintain
the lie at trial. Officer Ware and Detective Winters, on the other hand, were credible,
articulate witnesses who corroborated Kathy and Hardman's claim that Jackson was the
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aggressor and bolstered the credibility of their story. There is a reasonable probability,
therefore, that the jury would have acquitted if the trial court had not erroneously admitted
Officer Ware's and/or Detective Winters's hearsay testimony.
V.

JACKSON'S BATSONCHALLENGE WAS TIMELY

State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 140 P.3d 1219 (ValdezJQ) did not hold that a
defendant must "obtain a ruling on his Batson objection prior to dismissal of the venire."
Aple. Br. at 30. To the contrary, Valdez II held only that a defendant must raise his
Batson challenge "both before the jury is sworn and before the remainder of the venire is
dismissed in order to be deemed timely/' Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at i|]26.1
When read in context, the language from Valdez II cited in the State's brief
supports this reading of Valdez II. The State claims that Valdez II holds a Batson
objection must be decided before the jury is sworn and the venire is dismissed "'in order to

1

Sec also Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at p 0 (noting "that challenges to the jury, both to the
composition of the venire and the composition of the petit jury, must be raised before the
jury is sworn or they are untimely" (emphasis added)); icL at ^|35 ("In all of this court's
decisions since Span, we have never deviated from the rule that a challenge to the
composition of the jury must be rawed before the jury is sworn in." (citations omitted)
(emphasis added)); icL at ^|35 ("It has therefore long been the law in Utah that
constitutional challenges to the composition of the jury—both the venire and to the
selected jury—must be rawed before the jury is sworn." (emphasis added)); icL at p 7 ("It
is nonetheless clear under Utah law that a constitutional challenge to the jury selection
process—whether it be to the entire venire or to the jury selected to try the case—must be
brought before the jury is sworn." (emphasis added)); id. at ^[38 ("We hold that a Batson
challenge must be raised not only before the jury is sworn, but also before the remainder
of the venire is dismissed in order to be deemed timely under Utah law." (emphasis
added)); id. at ^[40 ("Obviously, if a Batson violation is to be remedied by seating the
wrongfully struck juror, . . . a Batson challenge must be razeed before the venire is
dismissed if the trial court is to properly rule on it." (citation omitted) (emphasis added));
id. at *SJ43 ("The rule we set forth, which requires that a Batson challenge be raised both
before the jury is sworn and before the venire is dismissed, efficiently allows the trial court
to determine the issues the Batson test is designed to resolve." (emphasis added)).
15

allow the trial court to adequately remedy a Batson violation if one has occurred/" Aple.
Br. at 30 (quoting Valdez II 2006 UT 39 at f33 n.19). In reality, the opinion says: "A
Batson challenge must be raised both before the jury is sworn and before the venire is
dismissed in order to allow the trial court to adequately remedy a Batson violation if one
has occurred." Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at ^|33 n.19 (citation omitted).
Likewise, the State claims that Valdez II holds that:
If an objection is raised—but not ruled on—prior to dismissal
of the venire, the judge is prevented from "reinstating the
stricken juror," thus requiring a mistrial. The supreme court
accordingly saw "no legitimate reason to sanction such an
inefficient use of judicial time and resources," and it therefore
held that even allowing a "Batson challenge to proceed after
the venire has been dismissed is only to sanction abuse."
Aple. Br. at 30 (quoting Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at 1)44) (emphasis in original). Actually, at
this point in the opinion, our supreme court was listing the reasons why a Batson challenge
"must be raised" before the jury is sworn and the venire is excused. Valdez II, 2006 UT 39
at i[j44. In context, the opinion says:
In addition, a Batson challenge must be raised in such a
manner that the trial court is able to fashion a remedy in the
event a Batson violation has occurred. As the Johnson Court
noted, the Batson test "encourages prompt rulings on
objections to peremptory challenges without substantial
disruption of the jury selection process." Id. (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). A Batson violation can only
be remedied without substantially disrupting the jury selection
process if it is brought before the venire is dismissed. If a
Batson violation is found before the venire is dismissed, the
violation can be remedied simply by reinstating the stricken
juror. Once the venire has been dismissed, however, a
sustained Batson challenge will require the trial judge to, at
minimum, call additional jurors, and may require the judge to
call an entirely new venire from which to select a new jury.
Also, if a Batson violation is found after the jury has been
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sworn and the venire excused, the only available remedy is a
mistrial. We see no legitimate reason to sanction such an
inefficient use of judicial time and resources, or to allow such a
burden to be imposed on the parties. Moreover, to allow a
Batson challenge to proceed after the venire has been
dismissed is only to sanction abuse. If such a result were
allowed, a party would be able to delay raising a Batson
challenge until it determined whether it approved of the
selected jury. Such sandbagging is antithetical to notions of
judicial economy and procedural fairness.
Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at ^[44 (first two emphases added) (footnote and citation omitted).
Our supreme court did not issue its mandate that defense counsel "has an absolute
obligation to notify the court that resolution [of the Batson objection] is needed before the
jury is sworn and the venire dismissed" until Rosa Re, which was published after
Jackson's trial. State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ^14, 190 P.3d 1259.
The State does not challenge Jackson's argument that he was not required to
comply with Rosa-Re's waiver rule. See Aplt. Br. at 35; Aple. Br. at 29-30. This is
correct because a court cannot prevent review of a Batson claim by applying "a rule
unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial." Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991).
Plus, in Rosa-Re, our supreme court specifically held that failing "to notify the court that
resolution [of the Batson objection] is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire
dismissed" will only "constitute a waiver" of the Batson objection "in the future." RosaRe, 2008 UT 53 at ^14. Thus, this Court should reach Jackson's Batson challenge because
it was timely.
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VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO
REOPEN ITS CASE AND PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
REGARDING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

First, the State claims that "Utah courts have long allowed the State to prove the
existence of a prior conviction by submitting documents establishing that a person with the
same name had been convicted of the stated crime." Aple. Br. at 44 (citing State v. Harris,
264 P.2d 284, 284-86 (Utah 1953); State v. Bruno, 256 P. 109, 109-11 (Utah 1927)).
Neither Harris nor Bruno, however, supports the State's claim.
In Harris, our supreme court explained that the rule where "identity of names is
prima facie evidence of identity of persons" is only recognized "sometimes" and is the
subject of "some conflict of authority." Harris, 264 P.2d at 286 (citations and footnotes
omitted). Plus, *'[e]ven where the rule is applied, the names must be identical" Id.
(emphasis added).
Thus, in Harris, "[t]he fact that one Mose Harris had been convicted would not, in
any event, constitute prima facie proof that the defendant Moses H. Harris had been
previously convicted. There would have to be other proof that such names referred to the
same individual before the matter could go to the jury." Id Whereas, in Bruno, evidence
that a person with the exact same name as the defendant "pleaded guilty to having
intoxicating liquor in her possession as shown by the records of the city court" was
sufficient evidence—not necessarily to prove the element—but to "submit[] to the jury in
thfat] case." Bruno, 256 P. at 110.
In this case, even if the "identity of names [was] prima facie evidence of identity of
persons," the rule did not apply because the name given in the SJ&C was not "identical" to
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Jackson's name. Harris, 264 P.2d at 286. Jackson's name is Henry Louis Jackson.
Whereas, the name in the SJ&C is "Henry L. Jackson." R. 207:3; State's Bench Trial Ex.
6. Thus, for the evidence to be sufficient, u[tjhere would have to be other proof that such
names referred to the same individual." Harris, 264 P.2d at 286. As explained in the
opening brief, however, the evidence presented at trial—before the trial court reopened the
case and granted the State additional time to gather its evidence—was insufficient to
clearly and definitely prove that Jackson "had previously been convicted of aggravated
murder, murder, or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(i) (Supp. 2006); see Aplt. Br. at 39-46.
Second, the State claims that Jackson's closing argument asking the court to acquit
him of the aggravating circumstance because the State failed to prove identity was "a new
defense." Aple. Br. at 47. It argues that reopening the case was an issue "of 'fairness,'"
not of whether Jackson admitted the identity clement. Aple. Br. at 46 (citation omitted).
And it claims, without citation, that "[t]he purpose" of the bench trial "was to determine
whether [Jackson] actually had a prior conviction for murder." Aple. Br. at 47.
In each of these arguments, the State attempts to shift the burden of proof to
Jackson. Identity was an essential element of the offense that the State had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt during its case-in-chief. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-1501(1) (2008) ("A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted."); id at § 77-17-3 (2008) ("When
it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to his defense,
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it shall forthwith order him discharged."); Utah R. Crim. P. 17(g)(3)-(5) ("The prosecution
shall offer evidence in support of the charge; . . . When the prosecution has rested, the
defense may present its case; . . . Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence
unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits."); R. 154 ("The defendant is presumed
to be innocent of the charge.").
If the State failed to meet its burden of proof, then Jackson's presumption of
innocence was not surmounted and he should have been "discharged" from the aggravating
circumstance element of the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3; see Menzies v. Galetka,
2006 UT 81,1J121, 150 P.3d 480 (Wilkins, J, concurring) ("[0]ur joint agreement,
embodied in both state and federal constitutions, provides the benefit of the doubt to the
accused. Periodically, some of the guilty go free as a result of the high burden we have all
imposed upon the State to prove our guilt. This allows us to be more certain that only the
guilty are punished."); Aplt. Br. at 39-46.
Perhaps, if the State's failure to prove identity in its case-in-chief was due to an
oversight, fairness might have justified the trial court's decision to reopen the case to
present additional evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 39-40. The record, however, shows that the
State's failure to prove identity was the result of a conscious decision, not an oversight.
See id at 40. The State assessed its evidence and concluded that the name Henry Jackson
on the Information and SJ&C was "sufficient" to prove its case. R. 207:4. Further, on
appeal, the Stale does not claim that its evidentiary failing below was due to oversight.
See Aple. Br. at 44-47.
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The State, therefore, has identified no justifiable reason for its failure to present
sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden. Accordingly, this Court should reverse because
the trial court abused its discretion when it reopened the State's case and granted the State
a second bite at the apple.
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN
IT DENIED JACKSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE

First, Jackson requested that the State produce the vehicle when he filed his request
for discovery shortly after his arrest. R. 11-12. The vehicle was important evidence: It
was physical evidence seized from Jackson, it was the alleged murder weapon in Count I,
and it may have contained exculpatory evidence regarding Counts II, III, and IV. See
Aplt. Br. at 47-48. Thus, to compel the State to produce the vehicle, Jackson did not have
to request the vehicle individually or explain the vehicle's probative value. See Aple. Br.
at 48-50. Rather, he had only to request discovery for the "physical evidence seized from"
him. Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(3). Jackson made this request:
On November 27, 2006, he requested "[a]ny photographs, video and/or audio
recordings, or physical evidence taken from the defendant. . . and/or the alleged crime
scene or taken by any such law enforcement officer during the course of the investigation
of [Jackson's] case by such police department, District Attorney, its staff or investigative
agencies." R. 11-12. He also requested "[a]ny evidence which tends to negate the guilt of
the defendant, or mitigate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the degree of the offense
that has been discovered"; and u[~r]ep°rts or descriptions of any weapon or other physical

21

evidence seized from defendant[']s person or his residence or vehicle that the State intends
to use at trial." R. 11-12.
Second, Jackson argues that his claim of prejudice is not "pure speculation." Aple.
Br. at 50. Rather, there is "a reasonable probability" that the vehicle "would be
exculpatory." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,1J44, 162 P.3d 1106. Further, he believes
that the "prejudice" to his case when the vehicle was destroyed was so "extreme" that
"fundamental fairness" required the case to be dismissed. Id. at 1J45.
There was blood in the vehicle. R. 97-98; 139:5. This blood may have been from
Jackson himself or from the pit bull. R. 97-98; 139:5. There may also have been saliva,
bite marks, or claw marks from the pit bull. If so, it would have supported his claim that
Hardman and the pit bull attacked him in his vehicle and that he acted in self-defense. R.
216.61-70. Without this evidence, Jackson could not substantiate his claim that Kathy and
Hardman were lying. See Aplt. Br. at 48; R. 216:64-70. Nor could he provide evidence to
support his version of the incident. See Aplt. Br. at 48; R. 216:64-70. Instead, he could
only ask the jury to believe his version of the events because he would have found
evidence in the vehicle if the State had not destroyed it. S^ee Aplt. Br. at 48; R. 216:68, 70.
The State claims that Jackson was not prejudiced because his conduct "could not be
self-defense under Utah law." Aple. Br. at 52. Whether Jackson acted in self-defense,
however, was a factual issue for the jury to decide, not the State. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-402(2003). Self-defense was Jackson's defense. SeeR. 169-70; 216:6-9, 61-69;
Aple. Br. at 26 n.3, 39. The State has not argued that the jury was improperly instructed to
consider self-defense. See Aple. Br. at 16-54. Thus, self-defense was properly before the
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jury and it was the jury's duty to decide whether the State disproved Jackson's claim of
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211,214 (Utah
1985) (U[AJ defendant is not required to establish a defense of self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence"; rather, "if the issue is
raised, whether by the defendant's or the prosecution's evidence, the prosecution has the
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense."
(citations omitted)); R. 170. The jury, however, could not properly assess the case because
the State's destruction of the evidence prevented it from hearing Jackson's side of the
story. See Mitchell, 779 P.2d at 1121-22 (When assessing prejudice, this Court will not
apply the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard; "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by
the error."); Sibcrt, 310 P.2d at 392-93 ("It is the exclusive prerogative of the jury to judge
the weight of the evidence and the facts to be found therefrom. It is of grave importance,
particularly in criminal trials, that such prerogative be left to them and that the proceedings
be conducted in such manner as to assure every safeguard to the rights of defendants.").
The prejudice to Jackson is particularly acute when weighed against "the reason for
the destruction or loss of the evidence." Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 at ^44. The State
destroyed the vehicle because it had no need for the evidence: It decided—without benefit
of blood testing or a jury verdict—that it knew who the aggressor was and who the victims
were. R. 215:187-88, 191. So it destroyed the evidence without giving Jackson an
opportunity to examine it for exculpatory evidence. R. 97-98; 139:3-4. Jackson, therefore,
asks this Court to reverse because the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss
for destruction of evidence.
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CONCLUSION
First; this Court should reverse with an order to dismiss because the trial court erred
when it denied Jackson's motion to dismiss. Second, this Court should reverse and remand
for a new trial because the State's peremptory strike violated equal protection and the trial
court prejudiced Jackson by admitting inadmissible hearsay and/or photographs. Third,
this Court should reverse Counts I and II and enter convictions for attempted murder, a
second degree felony, because the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the
State to reopen its case. Finally, this Court should reverse and remand for resentencing.
SUBMITTED this 2^\_ day of September, 2009.
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